Your devices identify each other
Each account has public identity information that can be shared to protect messages. The matching private information stays on the device.
These notes explain how VXN messaging works, what the delivery service can see, and which parts still need stronger testing. They describe the current Protocol V2 implementation—not a promise that any app can remove every risk.
Identity checks, message encryption and delivery have different jobs. A working connection alone does not prove you are talking to the intended person.
Each account has public identity information that can be shared to protect messages. The matching private information stays on the device.
Before upload, the app prepares protected message data using established encryption tools.
The delivery service checks routing information, queues the protected data, and makes it available to the intended recipient.
For readers who want the implementation details: the session protocol, message format, account identity and service responsibilities.
Active messages use vodozemac Olm sessions, identified as olm.v1.curve25519-aes-sha2. Curve25519 identity and one-time keys establish sessions. Ratcheting advances message keys as the conversation continues. Recovery bundles use XChaCha20-Poly1305 separately—it is not the active V2 chat cipher.
An envelope contains Olm ciphertext—the encrypted message—and visible routing and session fields. The app checks those outer fields against account, saved identity, route and session state. This validation is not the same as cryptographic authentication: not all outer fields are bound as AEAD associated data.
A Velix ID identifies your account without using a phone number or email address as the messaging identity. It is still an account identifier, not a guarantee of anonymity.
The service manages accounts, public-key distribution, message queues, delivery acknowledgements, expiry and basic abuse controls. Its role is to deliver encrypted messages, not to maintain a readable conversation archive.
Comparing identity QR codes directly reduces reliance on the service's public-key response. It is an identity check between contacts, not a judgement about whether someone is trustworthy.
Private keys and readable messages belong on the endpoints. End-to-end encryption cannot protect a conversation from someone who controls an unlocked or compromised device, or from a recipient who shares it.
Like many other messaging services, VXN processes account, sender and recipient IDs, message and client IDs, timing and approximate message sizes, public identity and session fields, delivery status and push-token associations. Network and abuse-control logs can also contain connection information. These records can reveal communication patterns even when message content is encrypted.
A sound design, working code and successful tests are different kinds of evidence. Using established encryption libraries does not automatically make the whole app secure.
Device-held keys, encrypted message content and a server delivery role define the intended trust boundaries.
The current V2 implementation includes Olm sessions, identity pinning, QR verification, protected local state and encrypted recovery. The checklist below describes these behaviours and their limits.
Project tests and recorded device checks cover session establishment, replies, ciphertext tampering, replay rejection and recovery. Coverage is incomplete. More extensive testing on real devices and in failure scenarios is planned during closed testing.
An independent security review is planned before wider release. It has not been completed, and the project does not claim independent audit approval or certification.
Current limitations and the next testing priorities, separate from features that are not yet available.
Protocol V1 is retired from the active client and public messaging API. Older notes about per-message XChaCha encryption and separately wrapped message keys describe that earlier design, not today's Olm message path.
Work to reduce metadata collection and retention is ongoing. The aim is to keep only what is needed to operate the service. See what the service currently sees and the privacy policy for data-handling details.
A dedicated secret-message deletion tool and the Vault feature are planned but not yet implemented. Server delivery confirmation and retention practices do not guarantee secure deletion from every device, log or backup.
The planned Google Play closed test will give particular attention to four implemented areas: consistent sender and recipient IDs, saving outgoing messages before sending them, saving received messages and session state before acknowledging delivery, and QR identity verification in V2. These need stronger evidence on real devices and when operations fail.
Public implementation and release-status checklist, based on the source review of 23 October 2026. A checkmark means implemented or observed. A dash marks work that remains ongoing.
| Implementation block | Status |
|---|---|
| 1. Device creates or loads protected identity keys. | Completed |
| 2. Client normalizes the sender and recipient IDs. | Completed |
| 3. Client fetches and validates the recipient public key and saved identity pin. | Completed |
| 4. Client creates fresh message encryption or advances the ratchet session. | Completed |
| 5. Client encrypts the plaintext locally with authenticated encryption. | Completed |
| 6. The client validates outer protocol, sender, recipient and client fields against the account, route, pinned identity and session state. Not all of these fields are cryptographically bound as AAD. | Implemented as validation, not cryptographic AAD |
| 7. Protocol V2 derives and advances message keys inside the Olm ratchet. The sender stores its protected local history. | Completed using the Protocol V2 design |
| 8. The client explicitly clears selected temporary cryptographic buffers. Comprehensive clearing of all copies across programming languages and platforms is not claimed. | Implemented |
| 9. Client validates envelope fields, sizes, encoding and UTF-8 boundaries. | Completed |
| 10. Client commits outbound ciphertext locally before network delivery. | Completed |
| Implementation block | Status |
|---|---|
| 11. Client sends the opaque envelope to the API over HTTPS. | Completed |
| 12. Public site and API are live over HTTPS. | Completed |
| 13. Certificate validity and external SSL checks were recorded on 10 September 2026. | Verified |
| 14. Server validates routing metadata without decrypting the message body. | Completed |
| 15. Server stores and queues the encrypted envelope for the intended recipient. | Completed |
| 16. Recipient client validates, decrypts and checks replay state locally. | Completed |
| 17. Recipient commits local plaintext/session state before acknowledging delivery. | Completed |
| 18. QR verification is available for direct contact identity checks. | Completed |
| 19. Recovery and key changes require deliberate state handling and re-verification rather than silent trust changes. | Completed |
| 20. Message content is encrypted. The service processes account, routing, timing, size, delivery, push and connection metadata. Reducing its collection and retention remains an ongoing task. | Metadata minimization remains ongoing |
A trusted VPN can add a layer of network privacy. When VXN traffic passes through it, the delivery service sees the VPN server’s IP address instead of your usual home or mobile address.
Your messages still rely on VXN’s end-to-end encryption. The service can still recognize your account and delivery activity, and you must trust the VPN provider with connection information. Check that the VPN covers the VXN app before relying on it.
Explore the network guideThis is the active Velixnet flow. Message content is protected on the endpoints, while the delivery service handles the limited visible information required to route the encrypted envelope.
The sender writes a message. Private identity keys and protected Olm session state remain on the device.
The app verifies the recipient's public identity against its saved pin, then creates or restores the Olm session.
Olm encrypts and authenticates the message and advances the ratchet. The app saves updated state and pending ciphertext before sending.
The app sends opaque Olm ciphertext plus required routing and session metadata over HTTPS.
VXN authenticates the sender, validates routing and queues the protected envelope. The server holds no Olm decryption key.
The recipient validates identity, session and replay state, decrypts locally, saves the message and updated state, then acknowledges delivery.
Content boundary: the server sees necessary delivery metadata and opaque ciphertext, not the readable message content handled by the sender and recipient devices.